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SENSITIVE

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SUBJECT: SOMALIA - The Case for Expanded Assistance

REF: Nairobi 246

1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Now is the time for the United States to provide an expanded package of security, development and humanitarian assistance to consolidate the formation of a new Unity Transitional Federal Government (UTFG) in Somalia, while ensuring that additional funds are made available to both Puntland and Somaliland. Reftel outlined the Mission's views on the way forward in Somalia. The cable urged that the United States demonstrate its strong commitment to Somalia's stabilization by providing \$50-\$100 million in immediate assistance this year (up from \$40 million), not only to support the new window of opportunity under the Djibouti Peace Process but to help both Puntland and Somaliland strengthen security and consolidate the democratic processes underway in those semi-autonomous regions. Septel will suggest ways to build the democratic, counter-terror and counter-piracy capacities of Somaliland and Puntland. End summary.

2. (SBU) While we are requesting early release of the FY 09 budget levels for Somalia (\$40.330 million), the overall requirements to support the latest developments in Somalia are substantial and we urge the Department and USAID to quickly match our strong political engagement with an equally strong financial one. The most urgent additional need is for assistance to the joint security forces, help establishing the Unity Transitional Federal Government (UTFG) in Mogadishu, support for reintegrating IDPs to Mogadishu, and basic provision of social services throughout Somalia. Below we make the case for greater flexibility on programming of the existing FY 09 budget and suggest specific recommendations for an expanded program of assistance.

Present FY 09 Budget Levels

3. (SBU) The new Unity Transitional Federal Government (UTFG) is established and will return imminently to Mogadishu, where peace is tenuous. The new government will face an al-Shabaab insurgency bent on assassinating and bombing UTFG officials and their AMISOM backers, and will be under pressure to quickly satisfy the Somali people's high expectations for speedy security, social and economic improvement. Despite the insecurity, and humanitarian and development challenges, Somalis are generally optimistic about their new President and prospects for progress. Post's FY 09 Somalia budget includes \$40.330 million encompassing \$20.250 million for Economic Support Funds (ESF), which includes \$1.25 M earmarked for basic education; \$11.6 million for Peace Keeping Operations (PKO), and \$8.48 million for Child Survival and Health (CSH). We should do more. An immediate release of flexible, significantly augmented FY09 assistance would allow us to capitalize on existing momentum

toward peace, and quickly provide programs to tangibly improve security and economic prospects first in Mogadishu and, possibly later this year, in areas outside the capitol as UTFG influence and security permits.

Top Transitional Priorities

14. (SBU) With the formation of the new unity government, the Transitional Federal Charter has been extended by two years, through August 2011. The top transitional priorities are:

- stabilization and security
- continued reconciliation
- basic functional capacity of the UTFG
- constitutional development and electoral processes
- provision of basic social services
- provision of humanitarian assistance and reintegration of IDPs.

Somalia Needs Security Funding...

15. (SBU) Immediate release of the FY 09 planned level of \$18.1 million in Peace and Security funds is critical in the next month to six weeks. With \$11.6 million PKO funds we will support the timely formation of the unity government's joint security force, and fund crucial AMISOM and regional training and mentoring of the joint force. However, the additional costs for standing up the joint security force are substantial. They include an additional \$10-\$15

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million in PKO funds to help provide non-lethal equipment, food and possibly stipends to the projected 5,000 joint security forces as well as further AMISOM training, technical assistance and capacity building support for the Joint Security Committee (JSC). Funds are also needed for support to the JSC-administered cease-fire monitoring arrangements. The Joint Security Force is already being deployed in Mogadishu. It is the only body standing between al-Shabaab's hit-and-run attacks on UTFG compounds and AMISOM.

16. (SBU) In addition, we request immediate release of the planned \$4 million in ESF funds to help expand civilian police training. (A total of 10,000 joint police forces are included as part of the over joint security forces complement described in the Djibouti Agreement.) The money would support community policing and carry out critical justice reform initiatives. An additional \$5-\$10 million in INCLE funds is recommended in order to expand civilian police training, mentoring, infrastructure rehabilitation and deployment of part of the 10,000 joint civilian police forces, as well as to support community policing and key justice sector reform initiatives.

17. (SBU) We would use the balance of planned \$2.5 million in ESF to expand conflict mitigation and reconciliation initiatives to complement our direct security assistance. With an additional \$10-\$15 million ESF we could better support the reintegration of IDPs in Mogadishu through quick impact economic and youth employment programs. So that Somalis can see progress on the ground, we need to provide training and employment opportunities for disadvantaged youth, particularly in Mogadishu. The recently launched Somalia Youth Livelihood Program can be quickly ramped up to address such needs.

...Coupled with Good Governance...

18. (SBU) Of the planned \$12.5 million ESF to foster just and democratic governance, we intend to program at least \$4.5 million to help the UTFG stand up key ministries that will deliver important social services, and that are responsible for advancing transitional tasks needed to bring about elections planned in 2011. We will provide support toward a basic "start-up package" to supply or improve the government's office equipment, supplies and furnishings,

as well as to improve UTFG ministries' and officials' effectiveness and influence on the ground. An additional \$10 million would enable us to improve basic functional capacity building in the Offices of the President and Prime Minister, and will assist in moving the Parliament from Baidoa to Mogadishu. This would include a "Ministries in a Box" program which has been successful in Afghanistan and Sudan. Additionally, immediate support is required to ensure the UTFG moves forward with dialogue to address power sharing and ensure the government remains broad based. Getting the Benadir Administration (the 16 districts of Mogadishu) up and running will be critical. Thus, support will need to be provided to the enhancement of the capacity of the regional, local and district councils of the Benadir region.

¶9. (SBU) We intend to utilize the planned \$6 million ESF for Political Competition and Consensus Building initiatives to reinforce the peace agreement and expand the ceasefire to other groups ready to join the political process. These funds will support the peace agreement through inclusive consensus-building initiatives, the drafting of a new constitution, sponsorship of national dialogues, and referenda on issues important to the Somali people. With this funding we can assist the unity government to broaden its appeal through dialogue, not force. These funds will also be utilized to build the capacity of the expanded parliament to carry out legislative functions and train public sector executives in the transparent and accountable management of government ministries.

¶10. (SBU) If we had an additional \$5-\$10 million in ESF we could provide better technical assistance and support to political processes required under the Transitional Federal Charter, such as constitutional reform, carrying out a national census and establishment of electoral institutions in preparation for national elections scheduled for 2011. Further, mutually accepted structures and processes for conflict management are required to build more peaceful, transparent and credible power sharing among the different members. Substantial support will be needed to carry out a transparent and inclusive constitutional process which will be

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critical for setting the road map for Somalia's future.

¶11. (SBU) Civil society needs to continue to play an important role in promoting peace, social and economic development and democratic governance. With the rapid disbursement of the planned \$2 million ESF for civil society strengthening we could: help deliver social and economic development services through quick impact projects; amplify civil society organizations' advocacy for peace and good governance; support media sector development; and engage the Somali Diaspora.

¶12. (SBU) An additional \$2 million for civil society will be required to ensure that influential civil society actors, including business, women's organizations, academic and religious leaders are engaged in the post-Djibouti negotiation and implementation process. At the moment civil society actors are unfortunately being under-utilized. In order for the peace process to have sustained traction, there needs to be a supported effort to ensure that these actors are able to provide advice to government officials as well as amplify concerns of grassroots communities.

...and Basic Social Services

¶13. (SBU) Under the FY 09 planned levels, we have \$8.48 million in CHS funds and \$1.25 million ESF earmarked to support basic education. However, we believe it is more appropriate to support an integrated program to provide better access to basic health services, clean water and basic education. Therefore, we request that F swap up to \$3.48 million in CSH funds for basic education funds. This would enable us to then program \$5 million CSH to support MCH interventions at both urban health facilities and at rural community levels. If this swap is possible, we would program \$4.73 million to support basic education programs which included a water component. These funds would also be programmed to expand the

successful Somalia Interactive Radio Instruction Program and in particular aim to reach the large number of IDPs and persons returning to Mogadishu, a goal Somali President Sharif highlighted to the Ambassador in a recent phone conversation (septel).

¶14. (SBU) We believe an additional \$10 million to \$20 million in non-food assistance will be required to expand and further integrate ongoing education, health and water service delivery programs nationwide, with a focus on Mogadishu. With additional funding for education, health and water, we will be well positioned to expand on-going integrated social service programs to an increasing number of Somalis nationwide. Emphasis will be placed on visible and quick-impact, community-based projects that can provide immediate tangible benefits to some of the most vulnerable members of society while laying the foundations for longer-term benefits. These additional funds would also enable us to provide basic social services to large number of IDPs expected to return and reintegrate into Mogadishu over the next twelve months.

¶15. (SBU) The new, unity government headed by President Sharif is determined to leverage the support it has among Somalis tired of years of conflict. Its return to Mogadishu finds opponents, like al-Shabaab, off-balance following the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops but still, as the February 22 suicide attack on AMISOM indicates, able to inflict damage on forces for peace and reconciliation in Somalia. The aid programs outlined in the preceding paragraphs must be implemented quickly if the window of opportunity provided by the formation of a new government is to be used. Embassy urges immediate, positive consideration of these proposals.

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RANNEBERGER